Visuddhimagga XXII-98

843. Tattha siyā yadā dukkhādīnaṃ aññepi rogagaṇḍādayo atthā atthi, atha kasmā cattāroyeva vuttāti. Ettha vadāma, aññasaccadassanavasena āvibhāvato.

或有人问：还是苦等的其它的如病及痈之义，为什么只说四义呢？答道：因为由于见其它的（集等之）谛而此等（病痈等）之义得以明了之故。

Ñ(XXII,98): Here it may be asked: 'Since there are other meanings of suffering, etc., too, such as "a disease, a tumour" (Ps.ii,238; M.i,435), etc., why then are only four mentioned for each?'. We answer that in this context it is because of what is evident through seeing the other [three truths in each case].

‘‘Tattha katamaṃ dukkhe ñāṇaṃ? Dukkhaṃ ārabbha yā uppajjati paññā pajānanā’’tiādinā (vibha. 794; paṭi. ma. 1.109) hi nayena ekekasaccārammaṇavasenāpi saccañāṇaṃ vuttaṃ. ‘‘Yo, bhikkhave, dukkhaṃ passati, samudayampi so passatī’’tiādinā (saṃ. ni. 5.1100) nayena ekaṃ saccaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā sesesupi kiccanipphattivasenāpi vuttaṃ.

此中：[《无碍解道》Pts.I,p.119.]「什么是苦的智？即由苦缘所生起的慧及知解」，由此等方法，亦即以一一谛为所缘而说谛智。又依这样的方法：[《相应部》S.56.30./V,p.437.；杂383(大正2.104b)]「诸比丘，见苦者亦见其集」等，是说以一谛为所缘，亦得完成在其余诸谛的作用。

Ñ: Firstly, in the passage beginning, 'Herein, what is knowledge of suffering? It is the understanding, the act of understanding ... that arises contingent upon suffering' (Ps.i,119), knowledge of the truths is presented as having a single truth as its object [individually]. But in the passage beginning, 'Bhikkhus, he who sees suffering sees also its origin' (S.v,437), it is presented as accomplishing its function with respect to the other three truths simultaneously with its making one of them its object.